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Abstract
Regulation often evolves, and affected consumers or firms may adjust their behavior
in anticipation of potential changes to regulation. Using shifting land use regulation
boundaries and oil lease prices from Canada, we estimate the effect of anticipated reg-
ulatory change on the value of land. We find that anticipated rezoning decreases the
price of unregulated leases. Based on our estimates, not accounting for anticipation
underestimates the total cost of the regulation by nearly one-third. Overall, the evi-
dence suggests that anticipation effects are significant and that the cost of anticipated
regulation is capitalized into land values.
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1 Introduction
Land markets are useful for assessing the effect of regulation. In particular, if the cost of
complying with regulation is capitalized into land values, one can compare the values of
regulated to unregulated land to measure the cost. However, regulation is rarely static and
often changes over time, and any anticipated costs from expected future regulation will also
be capitalized. Because it is difficult to observe where or when such anticipation arises, it
may be challenging to measure separately the effects of existing and anticipated regulation,
potentially compromising policy evaluation that is based on land values.1
In this paper, we estimate the effects of existing and anticipated land use regulation
on the value of land. We base our estimation strategy on a standard model of land use
regulation and land prices that is adapted to allow for possible rezoning in the future, in
which case the boundaries defining where the regulation is applied will change. Land markets
are competitive, so that the price of a land parcel is equal to its value. Any factors affecting
its value, such as the cost of complying with regulation, are capitalized into its price. If
regulation boundaries are anticipated to change, forward-looking markets will incorporate
the likelihood of rezoning and capitalize any expected costs of anticipated regulation into
the price of affected parcels.
If regulation boundaries are permanent, one can compare the price of parcels on either side
of existing boundaries to identify the effect of regulation: parcel values are identical except
for their regulation status, so any difference in price is due to the effect of the regulation.
If rezoning is anticipated, this strategy no longer works. To see this, suppose regulation
boundaries are anticipated to shift out. The information that unregulated parcels near
current boundaries will be regulated if rezoning occurs will be incorporated into the value of
those parcels. In this case, rather than identifying the cost of regulation, the price difference
across existing boundaries underestimates it, and instead identifies the difference between
the costs of existing and anticipated regulation. A similar logic applies when boundaries are
anticipated to shift inward.
To identify separately the effects of existing and anticipated regulation on land values
requires observing where rezoning is anticipated, which allows one to categorize which parcels
1Economists using land prices have been aware of the empirical challenges caused by expectations. For
instance, Freeman (2003) notes that in hedonic analyses, “it might be necessary to take account of expected
changes in the characteristics of a house... For example, if there are widespread expectations of an improve-
ment in air quality and the market adjusts reasonably quickly to these expectations, the price differential
between currently dirty houses and clean houses should decrease. Correlating these prices with existing levels
of air pollution would lead to an underestimate of the marginal implicity price of air quality.”
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are anticipated to be regulated in the future. One can then compare the price of regulated
and unregulated parcels, holding fixed the anticipated rezoning status, to identify the effect
of existing regulation. Comparing the price of parcels that differ only in whether they are
likely to be regulated in the future identifies the effect of anticipated regulation.
We apply this empirical approach to data from the Canadian province of Alberta. In
particular, we use prices for leases granting the right to develop ‘oil sands’ and land use
regulations that aim to protect endangered species from the adverse effects of oil sands pro-
duction. The regulations impose development restrictions in geographic zones determined as
critical habitat for the endangered species, and producers there incur costs of complying with
the regulations that they do not incur outside the zones. A key feature of these regulations is
that the zones have been gradually expanding over time, and we can observe where rezoning
is likely to occur and where it is unlikely to occur. Altogether, this information allows us to
categorize leases as being either regulated, currently unregulated but likely to be rezoned in
the future, or unregulated now and in the foreseeable future.
Using information on the nearly 3,000 oil sands leases sold between 2003 and 2012 and
employing a regression discontinuity design, we find that the price per hectare for a lease
inside a regulation zone is 30% lower on average than a lease that is not regulated and is
not likely to be regulated in the future. At the mean price per hectare in our sample, this
amount is equal to $238 per hectare in 2012 Canadian dollars. This finding suggests that
lease holders do capitalize the cost of regulation into the price they pay for their leases.
For leases that are unregulated but for which rezoning in the future is likely, we find that
their prices per hectare are about 16% lower on average than for leases that are unregulated
and not at risk of being rezoned. Though this estimate is imprecise, we find this effect
depends on the proximity to existing zone boundaries: for leases that are, for example, within
5 kilometers of a zone boundary, the price per hectare discount is 22% and is statistically
significant at conventional levels; the effect dissipates the farther is a lease from the existing
boundaries. This finding is consistent with the notion that, given the historical practice of
gradual zone expansion, leases near existing boundaries are believed to be at greater risk
of rezoning than leases farther away. However, realized boundary changes were not gradual
but instead were quite expansive, and our results suggest that firms underestimated the
likelihood of rezoning of unregulated leases far from existing boundaries. Overall, we take
these results as evidence that the costs of anticipated regulation are capitalized into lease
prices.
We use our estimates to calculate the total present value (PV) cost of the regulation. We
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find that the total PV cost of the existing and anticipated regulation for leases sold during
2003–2012 is between $1.6 and $2.3 billion in 2012 Canadian dollars. Estimates based on
specifications that fail to account for anticipation effects underestimate this amount by 29%.
Our study is relevant because anticipated changes to existing regulation, particularly
in the context of zoning, are a common feature of policymaking and our estimates suggest
that land values do fluctuate with anticipation about potential policy changes. Furthermore,
the results suggest that failing to account for anticipatory behavior by firms (or consumers)
can lead to underestimates of the total cost of regulation, causing problems for evaluating
policy in practice. More particular to the context of our application, the behavior caused by
anticipated regulatory change has negative implications for broader public policy, since the
costs are borne entirely by the government.
Research inferring the valuation of local amenities from housing prices has always dealt
with expectations, either implicitly or explicitly. One strand of the literature exploits quasi-
experimental variation and careful empirical analysis to nullify concerns about expectations
(see, for example, Chay and Greenstone (2005)). Another strand of the literature focuses
more directly on expectations: Kiel and McClain (1995) estimate the effect of the location
of an incinerator through the rumor, proposal, construction, and operation stages on nearby
housing prices, and find that expectations about the negative effects of a local incinerator
do decrease prices; in contrast, Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) find that the proposal
of Superfund clean up by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency does not affect local
house prices. And a recent set of papers takes account of expectations by forward-looking
consumers by explicitly incorporating them into models of housing demand (see Bishop and
Murphy (2011) and Bayer et al. (2016)).
We contribute to this literature in two ways. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the
first paper that considers how anticipation about potential changes to regulation boundaries
may be capitalized into land values. This contribution extends beyond the context of land
use regulation to research that, like our paper, applies regression discontinuity around ad-
ministrative boundaries to estimate causal effects. If boundaries in those contexts are known
to change over time, then anticipation effects may arise as they do in our study, posing an
identification challenge. For example, studies have compared property values across school
catchment boundaries to estimate the willingness to pay for school quality (see, for exam-
ple, Black (1999)).2 The redrawing of school zone boundaries over time is a well-known
2While many regression discontinuity-based studies exploit international or state/provincial boundaries
that are likely permanent and thus not subject to the anticipation effects we study, local administrative
boundaries are more likely to change over time. For example, municipal boundaries change because of sprawl
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characteristic of the public school system. To the extent that school boundary changes are
anticipated, the housing market will incorporate this information and property values will
adjust accordingly.3 In this case, only by accounting for anticipated boundary changes will
the willingness to pay for school quality be identified.4 More generally, in contexts where the
threshold in a regression discontinuity can change over time, anticipation about potential
changes to the threshold may in part cause the behavior being studied.5
Our second contribution to the literature on land values is that this paper is, to the best
of our knowledge, the first to investigate to what extent anticipated changes to land use
regulation are capitalized into the value of land. A large literature estimates the effect of
land use regulation, or zoning, on property values, with a recent example being Turner et al.
(2014). We contribute to this literature in two ways. First, we show that when boundaries
can change, accounting for anticipation about potential regulatory change is necessary to
identify the effect of regulation; not accounting for anticipation will lead to an underestimate
of the effect. Second, some land use regulation studies investigate how zoning can cause
externalities upon unregulated land values (Zhou et al. (2008), Turner et al. (2014)), such
as how curb appeal restrictions improve the value of unregulated but nearby properties.
Our study presents an alternative motivation – anticipation about potential rezoning in the
future – for why land prices vary systematically in proximity to existing regulation zones.
We also contribute to a nascent literature on anticipation effects, which mainly focuses on
behavior in anticipation of the implementation of a policy that has already been announced.
For example, Coglianese et al. (2016) investigate how gasoline consumption increases prior to
the implementation of a rise in the gasoline tax, and how such behavior alters how to use taxes
as instrumental variables to estimate the price elasticity of gasoline consumption. Similarly,
Lueck and Michael (2003) find that private landowners prematurely harvest their timber to
prevent forests from becoming inhabited by endangered species, thereby avoiding costly land
and annexation of adjacent lands, so comparing outcomes across municipal boundaries may be subject to
anticipation effects.
3The possibility of school boundary changes causes some real estate agents to warn clients about such
changes. In particular, some advise clients to search for housing strategically within neighborhoods or
blocks in order to maximize the chance of being in a desired school zone. For an example, see http:
//juliekinnear.com/blogs/school-boundaries-toronto.
4Though they do not estimate anticipation effects, Ries and Somerville (2010) exploit variation from
school catchment rezoning in Vancouver to estimate the effect of school quality on housing prices. Bogart
and Cromwell (2000) also examine the effects of school redistricting, and find that redistricting decreased
property values in Shaker Heights, Ohio.
5In their survey on the use of regression discontinuity in economics, Lee and Lemieux (2010) suggest as
much by warning that “optimizing behavior in anticipation of sharp regime change may either accentuate
or mute observed effects.”
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use restrictions under the U.S. Endangered Species Act (ESA). In contrast, Malani and Reif
(2015) provide a framework for identifying treatment effects in the presence of anticipation
of expected future treatment and apply their approach to study how physician labor supply
is affected by anticipated reform of tort laws.6 Our paper contributes to this literature by
studying how to account for and exploit anticipated changes of administrative boundaries to
evaluate policy.
This paper also contributes to the literature that measures the cost of protecting endan-
gered species. With the exception of Lueck and Michael (2003), mentioned above, this litera-
ture focuses on estimating the effects of existing endangered species regulation. For example,
Bosˇkovic´ and Nøstbakken (2016), on which this paper builds, find that existing endangered
species regulations impose significant and negative effects on oil lease prices. Greenstone and
Gayer (2009) find that ESA critical habitat designations may decrease housing values, while
Zabel and Paterson (2006) find that the number of building permits in cities are lower in
areas designated as critical habitats for endangered species. Given that endangered species
are typically protected using land use regulations and that zoning designations evolve over
time, our paper contributes to this literature by providing evidence that anticipated poten-
tial changes to endangered species regulations negatively affect the value of land and causes
a downward bias in the estimated cost of endangered species protection if unaccounted for.
In the next section, we describe a simple model that guides our empirical strategy. Section
3 describes the data we use. Section 4 describes the empirical specification and identification,
while Section 5 reports estimation results. Section 6 uses the estimates to calculate total
costs of regulation, which is then followed by concluding remarks.
2 A model of anticipated rezoning and land prices
This section describes a one-dimensional spatial model of land prices where land use is
regulated and the market anticipates a shift in the geographic boundaries defining where
the regulation is applied. Adapted from hedonic models of land prices, such as the seminal
paper by Rosen (1974) and, more recently, Turner et al. (2014), the purpose of the model is
to shed light on challenges to identifying the effect of regulation on prices when the market
anticipates rezoning.
The location of a parcel of land is denoted by x, and lies on the real line. The value of
6In contrast to the literature on anticipation effects, Boslett et al. (2016) exploit a lack of anticipa-
tion about New York’s moratorium on hydraulic fracturing to measure, using property values, the housing
market’s expected net benefits of shale gas development to private landowners in New York.
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owning a parcel x, exclusive of any costs from regulation, is described by the function V (x),
which is unobserved by the researcher. In our application, the owner of x has the right to
extract natural resources, so V (x) represents the net present value of profits excluding any
costs from land use regulation. Land values are spatially correlated, so that V (x′) ≈ V (x)
for x′ sufficiently close to x.
Land use regulation applies to parcels in certain areas or zones. For simplicity, suppose
that there is one such zone and the boundary is located at x: any parcel x such that x ≥ x
is subject to regulation, while any parcel x < x is not subject to regulation. An owner of a
regulated parcel incurs a cost, c, which represents the net present value cost of complying
with the regulation over the lifetime of owning the parcel.
It is possible that rezoning may occur, implying the boundary may move left or right
of x. Suppose, for simplicity, that the boundary x may expand leftward to x.7 If there is
no grandfathering with respect to the regulation, then parcels that are unregulated, which
lie between x and x, will be subject to the regulation under rezoning. Commonly-held
beliefs about the likelihood of rezoning are described by the probability function F (x), where
0 ≤ F (x) ≤ 1 for any x ∈ [x, x), and F (x) = 0 for any x < x and for any x ≥ x.
The market for land is competitive, causing the price of a parcel, which is observed by
the researcher, to equal the net present value from owning the parcel. For parcels that are
not regulated and for which there is no anticipation that status will change, i.e., x < x,
F (x) = 0 so that p(x) = V (x). For parcels that are subject to regulation, x ≥ x, the
competitiveness of the market implies that regulatory costs will be capitalized into land
prices, so that p(x) = V (x) − c for all x ≥ x. Similarly, leases that are not regulated but
may be subject to regulation, x ∈ [x, x), as a result of rezoning will have the expected cost
of anticipated regulation capitalized into their prices: p(x) = V (x) − F (x)c. Summarizing
the price of land, we have:
p(x) =

V (x) if x < x;
V (x)− F (x)c if x ≤ x < x;
V (x)− c if x ≥ x.
(1)
Figure 1 depicts a version of this model. The top panel, Figure 1a, plots land values
exclusive of the cost of regulation. For the purposes of illustration, we have depicted V (x)
7If the zone contracts, so that the boundary shifts to the right, the identification problem is much the
same, and unaccounted for anticipation effects will also in this case lead to underestimates of the effect of
regulation.
6
as linearly decreasing along the real line. The next two panels depict the price of land by
solid lines. Figure 1b is drawn under the assumption that rezoning will not occur. Figure 1c
relaxes this assumption with the additional assumption, for illustrative purposes, that the
probability of being subject to rezoning is constant and between 0 and 1, i.e., F (x) = F
and 1 > F > 0 for all x ∈ [x, x). In Figures 1b and 1c, the dotted line represents the
counterfactual price of land if there was no cost of complying with regulation.
Figure 1b depicts the standard motivation for using regression discontinuity (RD) around
geographic borders, with a recent example being Turner et al. (2014). Comparing average
land prices on either side of the border will not identify the cost of regulation, c, because
parcels are unobservably less valuable in the regulation zone. Due to an assumption that
land values are continuous, an RD approach that controls for geographic location by either
accounting for proximity to the boundary (thereby proxying for V (x)) or by restricting the
sample to parcels near the boundary identifies the cost parameter.
The scenario in Figure 1c is the focus of this paper. The possibility of rezoning induces
the market to capitalize expected costs into the price of parcels for which the status as
being unregulated is anticipated to change. While the market may be able to accumulate
information about rezoning prospects, such information may be difficult for the researcher
to obtain. If rezoning is unobserved by the researcher and the standard RD approach is
used, then the cost parameter will not be identified; instead, a difference in prices around
the existing boundary will yield (1− F (x))c for x just to the left of the boundary x.
Figure 1c depicts the likelihood of being rezoned, and thus the expected cost of antici-
pated regulation, as being constant over the unregulated area where rezoning is anticipated.
However, it may be the case that zones are anticipated to undergo gradual expansion, so
that parcels near the zone boundary x face a greater likelihood of being regulated sooner
than parcels farther away. In that case, the prices depicted in Figure 1c may instead look
like they do in Figure 2. In the latter, and for illustrative purposes, we assume that parcels
lying just to the left of the zone boundary x face a probability of being rezoned that is
equal to 1, so that the expected cost of anticipated regulation is exactly equal to the cost
of regulation; in this case, as depicted, there is no discontinuity in prices around x. At the
other end, x, the probability is equal to 0, so expected costs are equal to 0 and there is also
no discontinuity in prices there.8 For parcels in between the two boundaries, the probability
of rezoning increases with x, so that prices decrease at a faster rate toward x than do the
8If the probability is not equal to 1 near x, then there will exist a discontinuity in prices, though not
likely equal to the cost parameter. Similarly, if the probability is not equal to 0 near x, a price discontinuity
will exist there.
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V (x)
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(a) Land values excluding regulatory costs
x
p
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(b) Land prices with no possibility of rezoning
x
p
xx
(c) Land prices with possibility of rezoning
Figure 1: Anticipated rezoning and the price of land
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counterfactual prices under no regulation, depicted as the dotted line. As with Figure 1c, if
rezoning is unobserved by the researcher, a standard RD approach will identify the difference
in prices around the boundary x, which in the case of Figure 2 equals 0.
x
p
xx
Figure 2: Land prices when rezoning is anticipated to happen gradually
In econometric terms, the identification problem from not accounting for anticipation
effects arises because of a misspecification of treatment and control groups: being unregu-
lated, the group of parcels that anticipate regulation are misspecified as part of the control
group. The fact that they do incur expected costs from anticipated regulation means their
inclusion in the control group will make prices between treatment and control group seem
smaller than is the actual cost of existing regulation.
An obvious way to deal with this issue is to account for anticipated boundary changes,
so that the omitted variable is controlled for. In doing so, one will have to specify two
treatment groups: (1) those parcels facing existing regulation, and (2) those unregulated
parcels that may become regulated after rezoning. The existence of the boundary defining
the limit of anticipated rezoning, the point x in Figure 1c, allows us to define those that
anticipate regulation as a separate group from all other parcels. Parcels never subject to
regulation, x < x in our model, form the control group.
To identify the cost of regulation in practice, one cannot use the subsample of prices
for parcels near the regulation boundary. Instead, one must proxy for the unobserved value
function V (x) and potentially use the entire sample. Using the example depicted in Figure 1c
for illustration, by controlling for the relative location of a parcel by using a linear function
of proximity to the boundary x, one should be able to control for V (x). In doing so, this
effectively separates the land value exclusive of regulatory costs from the price of land. By
controlling for which parcels form the two treatment groups – those that are subject to
existing regulation and those unregulated parcels anticipating regulation – one can identify
the cost of regulation, c. However, unless the probability function F (x) is constant for all
9
parcels in the rezoning area, this approach will not identify F (x). Instead, because F (x)
changes over space – as it does in Figure 2 – this approach will identify the average expected
cost for unregulated parcels in the rezoning area, F (x)c, where F (x) is the average probability
that regulation is anticipated for parcels lying in the rezoning area. In our empirical analysis,
we investigate how F (x) changes over space by testing whether price discounts consistent
with anticipation effects decrease the farther is a given lease from the existing regulation
boundary, x, as depicted by Figure 2.
Overall, our analysis shows that anticipated boundary changes will confound identifica-
tion of the effect of existing regulation on land prices and will yield underestimates of the cost
of regulation. To deal with this issue requires accounting for anticipated regulation in the
empirical analysis. Furthermore, identifying the cost of regulation, as well as the expected
cost of anticipated regulation, requires an RD approach that accounts for the geographic
location of parcels as controls in price regressions. As we describe in the following sections,
we employ this approach in our empirical specifications.
3 Context and data
The setting for our application comes from Alberta, a province in Canada that is rich in un-
derground deposits of hydrocarbons. We make use of auction prices for oil leases and landuse
regulations aimed at protecting the environment for which there is reasonable anticipation
of rezoning. We describe each of these in turn.
Though mineral rights in Alberta are publicly owned, the provincial government sells
development rights to industry. Land leases are sold through first-price, sealed-bid auctions.
The government maintains that the auctions for development rights are competitive (Gov-
ernment of Alberta (2009)).9 Auctions are announced publicly ahead of the auction date,
and the winner and winning bid for each auctioned parcel are made public immediately.
Leases can be held indefinitely so long as they continue producing.
Predominant among Albertan hydrocarbons are oil sands, a mix of bitumen, water, and
sand from which synthetic crude oil can be produced. As of 2013, the prevalence of oil sands
puts Alberta as having the third-highest reserves of oil in the world (ERCB (2013)). Oil
sands production requires large start-up and operating costs relative to conventional sources,
which make oil produced from sands the marginal barrel for world oil supply (International
9Watkins (1975) and Watkins and Kirby (1981) found that Alberta’s oil and gas auctions were competitive;
the industry has only grown since the time of these studies.
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Energy Agency (2015)). The nearly 4,000 oil sands leases sold between 2003 and 2012, the
time period for our sample, generated about $4 billion in revenue (all dollar figures in this
paper are in 2012 Canadian dollars). The average price for these leases is about $800 per
hectare; Figure 3 plots their geographic price distribution.
The development of oil sands imposes significant negative effects on the environment.
Though known for its high greenhouse gas emissions, oil sands production creates immense
land disturbances. Among other impacts, this has caused and continues to cause severe pop-
ulation declines in woodland caribou, a species designated as endangered in Alberta (Boutin
et al. (2012)). To protect the endangered caribou from continued risk, the provincial govern-
ment has imposed land use regulations in caribou protection zones that restrict development.
The 31 geographically distinct zones, depicted in the darker shade in Figure 4, are drawn
based on critical caribou habitat areas for herds.10 An owner of a lease located in one of the
zones must develop a strategic plan to mitigate adverse effects on caribou habitat and migra-
tion, and the regulator must approve the plan. Operationally, the zones impose constraints
on production, implying lease holders incur costs from complying with the regulation that
would not be incurred outside the zones.11
While a protection zone is based narrowly on a herd’s critical habitat, the associated
caribou range defines the broader area in which the herd migrates and lives.12 As can be seen
from Figure 4, the caribou zones, the darker shade, are geographic subsets of caribou ranges,
depicted in the lighter shade. The reason this distinction is important is because the zones,
since their inception in 1991, have been expanded incrementally in the direction of range
boundaries and have never been contracted.13 The boundaries of caribou ranges, describing
the outer limits of a herd’s habitat and migratory areas, provide a natural endpoint for zone
expansion. Indeed, in 2013 the government expanded the zones a final time: protection zones
are now defined by range boundaries everywhere.
Even though a lease may lie in a range, as long as it lies outside zone boundaries it is
not subject to the regulation. A firm bidding on such a lease will know that, because of
the history of caribou zone expansion, its desired lease faces a positive probability of being
10These critical habitat areas are old-growth forests that that take approximately 80 years to develop (see
Dzus (2001)).
11Examples of such activities include reducing the clear-cutting of forests, creating roads and pipelines that
circumvent caribou routes and habitats, limiting seismic disturbances from drilling, and restoring seismic
lines and cleared areas to original conditions as soon as possible.
12The ranges were mapped from surveys in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Alberta Woodland Caribou
Recovery Team (2005)). And, unlike boreal caribou, woodland caribou do not migrate long distances.
13This expansion is well-documented in government reports; see Dzus (2001) and ASRD and ACA (2010).
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Figure 3: Price per hectare, in 2012 Canadian dollars, of oil sands leases auctioned during
2003–2012
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Figure 4: Caribou zones and ranges, 2003–2012
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rezoned as part of an expanded protection zone. The firm will incorporate its belief about
this likelihood and the net present value of complying with the regulation into its bid for the
lease. As a result, this setting is an appropriate context for testing the model’s predictions
in Section 2 by producing the three categories of land: (1) the protection zones, where leases
are currently subject to regulation; (2) the range areas outside protection zones, where lease
holders can reasonably expect to be subject to regulation following rezoning, and; (3) the
area outside both range and zone boundaries, which will never be regulated.
We follow this categorization by overlaying the auctioned leases on the map of regulation
zones and ranges to determine whether a given lease falls within a particular zone or outside
the zone but within the associated range. We categorize any lease falling outside any zone
and any range as never being regulated, either now or in the future. We exclude any leases
that fall into multiple zones.
For each lease, we determine its geographic centroid, in degrees latitude and longitude,
to calculate distances to zone boundaries. We exclude any leases more than 200 kilometers
outside a zone or range and any leases overlapping a boundary. Also, for estimation purposes,
we exclude any lease whose owner is observed only once in our sample. We also focus on
leases sold between 2003 and 2012, since the boundaries were shifted in 2002 and again, as
mentioned above, in 2013.14 Altogether, these criteria narrow our sample to 2,918 leases
that lie inside or near 17 protection zones and 13 ranges.
Table 1 reports sample means and standard deviations for leases for the full sample in
the first column, and by regulation status in columns 2 to 4. Also reported in the final three
columns are difference in means for each subsample of regulation status and the associated
standard error in parentheses. The number of regulated leases – those located inside protec-
tion zones – equals 1,326 in our sample, which is roughly equal to the number of leases that
are and never will be regulated – those located outside zone and range boundaries – of which
there are 1,272. There are 320 leases for which rezoning is anticipated, which constitutes
approximately 10% of the sample.
The first row reports statistics for the auction price per hectare of individual leases. The
price measure is higher on average for leases within protection zones than everywhere else,
although the differences are statistically insignificant. The distribution of price per hectare
14We obtained the location of the zones and ranges from shapefiles available on the Government of Alberta’s
website. Prior maps are not available in digital form and repeated requests to the government for precise
maps have proved unsuccessful. The expansion in 2013 was followed by an intervention by the federal
government, under the auspices of the federal Species at Risk Act (SARA), into saving the caribou. Under
SARA, new rules are due in 2016; the uncertainty of what rules will be implemented caused us to cut off the
sample at 2012.
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for our sample has a long right tail; this fact motivates us to use the natural logarithm of
price per hectare for our empirical analysis in the next section.
The second row reports summary statistics for the count of firms with an ownership stake
in a given lease. On average leases are owned by a single firm.15 The total number of firms
in the sample is 94, and the number of firms in a given group is reported in the bottom row
of the table.16 In the full sample, 66 of the 94 firms own leases inside zone boundaries, 49
firms own leases in unregulated range areas, while 88 of the firms own leases outside of the
zones.
Rows three and four report summary statistics for binary variables indicating whether the
lease falls into areas where other forms of regulation are applied, known as key wildlife and
special access areas, which impose different land-use regulations to protect biodiversity.17
The final row reports summary statistics for the depth, in meters, of the core sample for
that lease.18 This variable provides information on the cost of extracting oil sands for that
lease, since deeper deposits require greater effort and more cost to produce to the surface.
This is consistent with the correlation with average prices: leases outside zones are deeper
on average and command lower prices per hectare than leases in zones.
4 Empirical specification and identification
In this section, we describe the empirical specification for estimating the effects of the current
caribou protection regulation and the anticipated rezoning of unregulated areas on the price
of oil sands leases. We then discuss how we identify the effects of interest and potential
identification issues.
To estimate the effect of existing and anticipated regulation on lease prices, we follow the
analysis in Section 2 by specifying a regression that exploits the discontinuity in regulation
and anticipated regulation at zone and range boundaries, respectively. The model makes
clear that accounting for geographic location is critical for identification. To do so in two-
dimensional space, we follow Dell (2010) by employing a multidimensional RD that accounts
15If a lease is owned by more than one firm, we will refer to the owner that interacts with the regulator as
the main owner.
16As we mentioned above, we excluded from our sample any leases for which we observe the owner only
once. This criterion removes 26 unique firms from our sample and does not affect the distribution of firms
across the areas of different regulation status.
17See Government of Alberta (2013) for more details on these regulations. Conversations with some of the
producers revealed that complying with the caribou land-use regulation is of much greater concern.
18Core samples are made publicly available by the Government of Alberta; see http://www.ags.gov.ab.
ca/services/mcrf/.
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for geographic location using latitude and longitude as well as the identity of the nearest
zone. In particular, for lease i near zone z, purchased by firm j in year t, we estimate:
pizjt = α + β1 zonei + β2 rangei +WiΓ + f(xi, yi) + λz + λjt + εizjt. (2)
The dependent variable, pizjt, is the logarithm of the auction price per hectare for lease i.
The variable zonei describes whether lease i is subject to the land use regulation: the variable
is equal to 1 if lease i is located inside any zone, implying that the lease is regulated, and is
equal to 0 otherwise, in which case it is unregulated. The variable rangei is equal to 1 if lease
i lies inside a caribou range but outside any caribou protection zone, and is otherwise equal
to 0. This indicator variable defines the group of leases that are currently unregulated but
can reasonably anticipate, given the history of these regulations, to be subject to regulation
in the future following an expansion of the zones. Should zonei and rangei both equal 0,
then lease i lies outside of any zone or range and is not and never will be regulated. Though
leases for which rangei = 1 are unregulated, for convenience we will refer to them as “range
leases” to distinguish them from unregulated leases located outside ranges, which we will
refer to as “unregulated leases.”
The multidimensional RD is based on the variables xi and yi, describing the latitude and
longitude in degrees of lease i, the function f , and the parameters λz. The unknown function
f controls for smooth functions of geographic location that affect the profitability of land
and, thus, the observed winning bid for lease i, such as the underlying resource stock and
distances to hubs where producers obtain their inputs for production. The parameters λz
are fixed effects that account for the zone to which lease i is near (regardless of regulation
status), and control for differences in lease prices across zone regions.19
A practical issue is how to estimate equation (2) given the function f is unknown. Here
we again follow Dell (2010) and specify f as a series of polynomials in latitude and longitude.
While there is no rule on which degree polynomial to employ, though too high a degree may
result in overfitting, we use a quadratic polynomial for our baseline specification.20 To test
the sensitivity of our results to this specification, we will report results from re-estimating
equation (2) using polynomials of lower and higher degree.
The vector Wi contains information specific to the lease, such as the number of joint
19Recall that each zone is a subset of a range and that multiple zones might fall into a range. As a result,
employing a range fixed effect is less flexible than employing zone region fixed effects and range fixed effects
are redundant given we use zone region fixed effects.
20If latitude and longitude are denoted by x and y, then the quadratic in latitude and longitude is x2 +
y2 + xy + x + y.
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owners, all of which are listed in Table 1. The parameters λjt are fixed effects that account
for time-varying firm-specific differences in winning auctions bids that account for, among
other factors, differences in production technologies and the timing of when firms obtain
leases.
The parameters β1 and β2 are the parameters of interest. The parameter β1 captures the
price effect for a lease that is regulated because it is located inside a protection zone. If the
regulation imposes costs over the lifetime of owning the lease and such costs are capitalized
into the winning bid for the lease, then we expect that the regulation will impose a negative
effect on price, so that β1 < 0.
The parameter β2 captures the average price effect of owning a lease that is located inside
a range but outside any protection zone. Being outside a protection zone implies the lease is
not regulated, while being located inside the range implies there is reasonable anticipation
it will be subject to regulation in the future following rezoning of the protection zones. If
the anticipated regulation imposes expected costs and those costs are capitalized into lease
prices, then we expect that β2 < 0. If bidders believe that the probability that such a lease
will be rezoned is close to 1 and that rezoning will occur sufficiently soon, then the expected
cost of anticipated regulation will approximately be equal to the cost of existing regulation,
in which case we expect that β2 = β1. Otherwise, the expected costs should be smaller in
magnitude than the cost of regulation incurred by a lease inside a zone, so that β2 > β1.
Equation (2) does not capture any heterogeneity in anticipation effects, though there
is reason to suspect that different range leases may be perceived as more or less likely to
be regulated in the future. In particular, as we described in Section 3, the caribou zones
have been gradually expanded over time. Figure 2 of Section 2 depicts how lease prices may
change if the zones are anticipated to change gradually: leases near the existing regulation
boundary are anticipated as more likely to be regulated than leases farther away, implying
that the anticipation effects depend on proximity to existing zone boundaries and are stronger
the closer is a lease to a boundary. We test this prediction by augmenting the baseline
specification in equation (2) to take the following form:
pizjt = α+β1 zonei + β˜2 rangei + β˜3 rangei×distancei +WiΓ +f(xi, yi) +λz +λjt + εizjt, (3)
where distancei is the distance, in kilometers, of lease i to the nearest zone boundary. Ac-
cording to this specification, the effect of lying in a range area is equal to β˜2 + β˜3distancei.
At the mean value for the distance measure, this effect should equal β2 from equation (2).
If range leases near zone boundaries face greater expected costs from anticipated rezoning
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than leases farther away, then we expect that β˜3 > 0.
4.1 Identification
The identification strategy premised on equation (2) (and equation (3)) attributes, after con-
trolling for geographic location, firm-specific time-varying heterogeneity, and lease-specific
differences, any difference in prices between leases inside zones and unregulated leases to be
caused by the regulation. Similarly, after incorporating our full set of controls, we attribute
any price difference between range leases and unregulated leases to be caused by anticipation
of potential future regulation. Several issues affect the identification and interpretation of
the effect of existing and anticipated regulation, such as: (1) the determination of zone and
range boundaries; (2) selection of leases by firms; (3) externalities caused by the regulation,
and; (4) competitiveness of auctions. We discuss each of these in turn.
An implicit identification assumption we are making is that the zone and range boundaries
are determined independently of the underlying oil sands resource. If that were not the
case, then we may be erroneously attributing any difference in prices as being caused by
existing or anticipated regulation, whereas the difference may be due in whole or in part
to the unobservable resource quality associated with the leases that discontinuously changes
at zone or range boundaries. However, we have no reason to believe the boundaries were
determined by the location of the resource. The range boundaries, describing the outer limits
of a caribou herd’s habitat and migration area, were drawn by ecologists decades prior to the
initial implementation of the land use regulations (Dzus (2001)). The zones describe critical
habitat for caribou, which is determined mainly by the location of old-growth boreal forests
on which caribou rely for survival (Environment Canada (2012)).21 Such boreal forests cover
not only most of the northern half of Alberta, but also the northern area of most Canadian
provinces, and woodland caribou exist in most of those regions. It is a coincidence that oil
sands deposits lie below caribou ranges and critical habitats in Alberta.
The second potential identification issue is whether leases are chosen based on whether
they are located in zones or ranges; the ability to manipulate the regulation treatment by
selecting a lease based on location would invalidate a typical RD application. However, in
our application, regardless of whether the lease is inside a zone or a range or is unregulated,
in equilibrium bidders will pay the value of owning that land. As such, a firm that chooses
21Oil sands extraction projects do not necessarily involve forest removal and land clearing: in situ projects,
which are the more prevalent form of oil sands operations, create linear land disturbances by creating access
roads but otherwise keep much of the forest intact.
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to purchase a lease in a regulated area can fully compensate itself for the cost of complying
with the regulation by decreasing its bid in an amount equal to the cost and still win the
lease. This behavior does not pose an identification problem, but instead we rely on this
behavior to identify the effect of existing and anticipated regulation on land prices.22
A similar issue is whether some leases that would have been purchased in the absence
of regulation are left unsold because the regulation causes them to be unprofitable. We are
unable to deal with this selection issue, in which case we will be identifying the effect of
existing and anticipated regulation on leases for which the net present value of owning the
lease, including the cost of regulation, is non-negative.23
The third identification issue is externalities arising from the regulation. The presence
of such externalities motivates part of the analysis in Turner et al. (2014), who study how
land use regulation for residential housing, such as restrictions that homeowners maintain
curb appeal, can impose externalities on prices for housing across a nearby administrative
boundary. If such externalities exist, then they may cause a similar effect on lease prices as
does anticipation about potential rezoning.
We do not suspect externalities to pose an identification problem for two reasons. The
first reason is based on context: externalities such as those present in the zoning of residential
housing are unlikely to arise in our context. Aside from the spatial correlation in resource
stocks, how one oil sands firm bids for a lease should not be affected by the fact that nearby
leases are regulated. The second reason is due to our identification strategy. If externalities
can arise in our context, then because both unregulated leases and range leases are located
near zones, both will equally be subject to externalities. Our strategy for identifying the
effect of anticipated rezoning compares prices for range and unregulated leases, in which case
the effect of externalities should be differenced out. As a result, we do not suspect that this
should confound our estimates of the effect of existing anticipated regulation. Nonetheless, we
perform robustness checks to determine externalities may be driving our baseline estimates,
which we report in the next section.
The final identification issue we consider is the competitiveness of the auctions. Although
we observe the winning auction bid, we do not observe, and neither does anyone but the
regulator, any non-winning bids or the number of bidders. The government claims that the
22It may be the case that certain firms are better able – in the least-cost sense – to comply with regulations
and so are more likely to obtain leases in the zones. However, assuming auctions are competitive, we are
able to control for producer identity, and thus our identification strategy is robust to this issue.
23We discussed this issue with several members of the industry, who claimed that the costs of complying
with the caribou protection regulation were not large enough to dissuade the purchase of any lease their firm
was considering.
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auctions are competitive (Government of Alberta (2009)) and there is no evidence suggesting
otherwise. Watkins (1975) and Watkins and Kirby (1981) found that Alberta’s oil and gas
lease auctions in the 1970s were competitive, and the oil and gas industry in Alberta has
only grown since then.
5 Estimation results
Table 2 reports results from estimating equations (2) and (3) as well as a specification that
misspecifies range leases as unregulated leases. Each of these sets of results is reported in a
separate panel. The columns indicate estimates from using progressively richer specifications.
Robust standard errors, which account for spatial correlation by adjusting for clustering
within a zone region, are in parentheses. We discuss each panel of results in turn.
Panel A of Table 2 reports our baseline results from estimating equation (2). Column
(1) reports coefficient estimates from a regression that controls only for whether a lease is
located inside a zone or a range. The coefficient for the zone variable, 0.0289, indicates that
a lease inside a zone is associated with a price per hectare that is 2.9% larger on average
than the price per hectare for an unregulated lease. The coefficient estimate for the range
variable, −0.0199, indicates that a lease in a range is associated with a price per hectare
that is nearly 2% lower on average than an unregulated lease. These estimates reflect the
pattern of unconditional mean prices per hectare reported in Table 1.
Columns (2) and (3) in Panel A add the polynomial in latitude and longitude and the
zone region fixed effects, respectively, that form the multidimensional RD. The addition
of the latitude-longitude polynomial in column (2) decreases the value of both zone and
range coefficients so much that both estimates are of the predicted sign and are statistically
significant. The estimates reported in column (3) include the zone region fixed effects, which
control for the identity of the nearest zone to a given lease; their inclusion reduces the
magnitude of both coefficient estimates relative to column (2), although much less so for
leases lying in zones.
Column (4) adds the firm-year fixed effects, which are important not only in controlling
for time trends in this volatile industry but also in how each firm responds idiosyncratically
to those trends. These fixed effects control for a significant amount of variation in the
dependent variable, which can be seen from the substantial increase in the R2 value. The
coefficient estimate for the zone variable, −0.3179, is statistically significant at the 1% level,
while the coefficient estimate for the range variable, −0.1535, is insignificant at conventional
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levels.
Table 2: Estimates of the effect of existing and anticipated regulation on lease prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Baseline estimates
Zone 0.0289 -0.3326∗∗ -0.2254∗ -0.3179∗∗∗ -0.3536∗∗∗
(0.1743) (0.1362) (0.1144) (0.0976) (0.0878)
Range -0.0199 -0.5339∗∗∗ -0.2578 -0.1535 -0.1721
(0.2085) (0.1737) (0.1901) (0.1173) (0.1174)
R2 0.0001 0.1002 0.1549 0.5534 0.5543
B. Heterogeneous anticipation effects by distance to zone boundary
Zone 0.0289 -0.3345∗∗ -0.2296∗ -0.3245∗∗∗ -0.3604∗∗∗
(0.1744) (0.1356) (0.1157) (0.0940) (0.0850)
Range -0.2573 -0.6277∗∗ -0.3730 -0.2479 -0.2687∗
(0.3269) (0.2958) (0.3365) (0.1522) (0.1513)
×Distance to zone boundary 0.0219 0.0087 0.0109 0.0094 0.0096
(0.0142) (0.0148) (0.0177) (0.0089) (0.0092)
R2 0.0016 0.1004 0.1552 0.5536 0.5545
C. Misspecifying anticpated leases as unregulated
Zone 0.0329 -0.1465 -0.1346 -0.2604∗∗ -0.2879∗∗∗
(0.1489) (0.1126) (0.0886) (0.1046) (0.0905)
R2 0.0001 0.0942 0.1536 0.5531 0.5539
Quad. poly. in lat/lon N Y Y Y Y
Zone fixed effects N N Y Y Y
Owner-Year fixed effects N N N Y Y
Lease controls N N N N Y
Observations 2918 2918 2918 2918 2918
Notes: The dependant variable is the logarithm of price per hectare at the lease level. Robust standard
errors, adjusted for clustering by caribou zone region, in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote estimates
different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels.
The estimates in column (5) are from the full specification, which adds the lease-specific
controls listed in Table 1.24 These controls do not change the estimates much numerically
relative to the column (4) estimates. Because it uses the full set of controls, the specification
in column (5) is our preferred one, so the estimates in that column deserve a closer look.
The coefficient estimate for the zone variable, −0.3536, is statistically significant at the 1%
level. The estimate indicates that the price per hectare for a lease located inside a zone and
24For brevity, we omit the coefficient estimates for the lease-specific controls here, but do provide them in
the Appendix.
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thus subject to the endangered caribou regulations is 30% lower on average than the price
per hectare for an unregulated lease. At the mean and median prices per hectare in our
sample of $803 and $135, this estimated effect amounts to a decrease in price of a lease by
$238 and $41 per hectare. We take the estimated negative effects on the price of zone leases
as evidence that the land use regulations impose costs on producers.25
The coefficient estimate reported in column (5) of Table 2 for the range variable, −0.1721,
is not significant at conventional levels, but has a p-value of 0.162 even though our sample
contains only 320 ranges leases. An equality test between the zone and range coefficient
estimates yields a p-value of 0.14. The range coefficient estimate implies that the price per
hectare for a lease in a range, even though it is not regulated, is about 16% lower on average
than the price per hectare for an unregulated lease. At the mean and median price per
hectare, the estimate implies a price discount of approximately $128 and $22 per hectare,
respectively. The negative price effect for range leases is consistent with the prediction that
the expected costs of anticipated future regulation are capitalized into auction prices for
those leases. Note that this specification assumes the anticipation effect to be constant for
all range land. Hence, heterogeneity in anticipation effects – arising, for example, if the
anticipation effect decreases with the distance to a zone boundary – will raise the p-value of
the range coefficient.
In Panel B, we report results from estimating equation (3), which allows the anticipation
effect to vary with the distance of a range lease to the nearest zone boundary. For the
specification given by each column, the coefficient estimate for the range indicator variable,
in the second row, is negative, while the coefficient estimate for the interaction of the range
variable with distance to the nearest zone boundary, in the third row, is positive. The signs
of these coefficient estimates are consistent with the prediction depicted in Figure 2 and
with the notion that rezoning is anticipated to occur, based on historical practice, through
gradual shifts in zone boundaries. Focusing on the preferred estimates in column (5), the
estimate for range indicator, −0.2687, is statistically significant at the 10% level, while the
coefficient estimate for the interaction term is positive, though insignificant at conventional
levels. For the range lease that is closest to a zone boundary – less than 20 meters from
the boundary – the estimated effect of being located in the range is equal to −0.2675, is
statistically significant at the 10% level, and implies a price per hectare discount of about
25We discussed these estimates with several stakeholders, who all thought they were reasonable. For
example, a leading investor in oil and gas in Alberta told us he expected the caribou regulations to have a
slightly larger effect than our estimates indicate, while an executive with the provincial regulator expected
the effect to be smaller than what we found.
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23.5% relative to unregulated leases. Given that our estimate for the effect of lying in a zone
causes price per hectare discounts of more than 30%, this implies that range leases virtually
adjacent to a zone boundary internalize expected costs that are smaller in magnitude than
the costs capitalized into prices for regulated leases. For a range lease that is 5 kilometers
from the zone boundary, the price per hectare is 22% on average lower than the price for
an unregulated lease. The effect decreases in magnitude the farther is a range lease from
the boundary, and for leases that are greater than about 5 kilometers the price effect is
statistically insignificant at conventional levels; for example, the negative price per hectare
effect for a range lease that is 20 kilometers from the nearest zone boundary, about one-
standard deviation farther than the mean distance of range leases, is about 7.4% on average.
Altogether, the estimation results in Panel B of Table 2 support the prediction that the
effect on the price for range leases increases the nearer is a lease to the zone boundary. This
evidence is consistent with the notion that future regulation in the form of expanding zones
are anticipated to occur through gradual boundary shifts, which was the historical practice
in this context up until that time. However, it is noteworthy that the boundary changes
in 2013 did not follow historical practice: instead of gradual expansion of the zones, the
boundaries shifted dramatically so that every zone boundary coincided with every range
boundary. In some cases, that meant a shift of more than 50 kilometers, which, based on the
results reported in Panel B, was not anticipated to occur soon by the firms that purchased
leases. Because firms’ anticipation about potential future regulation relied on their likely
belief that zones would expand gradually – as they always had been – it is not a surprise
that they underestimated the likelihood that distant range leases would be rezoned relatively
soon.
Panel C of Table 2 reports results from a specification that omits the range variable in
equation (2) and naively categorizes range leases as unregulated leases. As predicted by
the model in Section 2, not accounting for which land parcels lying outside zones may be
rezoned leads to an underestimate of the effect of regulation on lease prices. Comparing the
results in Panel C to those in Panel A provides evidence in favor of the prediction: across
the specifications in each column, the coefficient estimates describing the effect on the price
for a lease located inside a protection zone in Panel C are consistently smaller in magnitude
than the corresponding estimates in Panel A. Focusing on column (5) and Panel C of Table
2, the coefficient estimate of −0.2879 implies a negative price per hectare effect of 25% for
leases inside zones, which is 5 percentage points smaller in magnitude than when we control
for which leases are located in ranges. To put this difference in estimates into perspective,
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the effect for the mean price per hectare, based on the estimate in Panel A of −0.3536,
implies a price per hectare decrease of $238; this amount is underestimated by $38 when not
accounting for which leases may be plausibly rezoned in the future.
5.1 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we report results from two robustness checks that investigate the stability of
the estimates reported in Table 2. The first re-estimates the specifications using subsamples
based on the distance of leases to the nearest protection zone boundaries. The second re-
estimates the specifications from that table using polynomials in latitude and longitude of
higher and lower degree. We discuss each in turn.
The first robustness check we perform is re-estimating the empirical specifications us-
ing subsamples based on decreasing proximity of leases to protection zone boundaries. This
check is useful for two reasons. First, as described in Dell (2010), who first employed a multi-
dimensional RD, narrowing the distance of observations to the relevant boundary allows one
to assess the validity of the RD estimates in a similar way to the approach in conventional,
one-dimensional RD settings. The second reason is to assess whether our anticipation effects
are being driven by externalities cause by the regulation, which is a potential identification
issue we discuss in Section 4.1. As we stated there, our strategy to identify the effect of
anticipated regulation will, if unregulated leases and range leases are equally affected by
externalities (because of their proximity to zone boundaries), difference out any effect of
externalities on lease prices. However, in our sample, unregulated leases are on average far-
ther from zone boundaries than range leases. Because externalities caused by the regulation
likely dissipates with distance from zone boundaries, unregulated lease prices are on average
less affected by externalities than range lease prices. As a result, our comparison of range
and unregulated lease prices may not fully difference out the effect of externalities, since
on average range and unregulated leases are not equally affected by externalities. Though
we do account for geographic location in our estimation specification, likely controlling for
this issue, a simple way to determine whether this is an issue in practice is to restrict our
sample so that range and unregulated leases are of similar proximity to zone boundaries and
then re-estimate equation (2). We do this by restricting leases to be no farther from zone
boundaries than 100, 75, 50, and 25 kilometers, and report estimation results in Table 3.
Each panel reports a different set of estimation results using the specified distance cutoff,
and the specification in each column is either the baseline estimating equation (2), the spec-
ification allowing for heterogeneous anticipation effects by distance to zone boundary, (3),
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or the specification that categorizes range leases as unregulated leases. All specifications in-
clude the full set of controls, making the estimates directly comparable to the corresponding
estimates in column (5) of Table 2.
The estimates in each panel are fairly similar to the estimates reported in Table 2.
Consider first the zone coefficient estimates in the first column. With the exception of
the 50-kilometer estimate, the coefficient estimates are virtually the same numerically as
−0.3536, the main estimate from column (5), Panel A of Table 2. The same can be said for
the zone coefficient estimates in the second column. The estimates in the third column are
obtained from misspecifying range leases as unregulated, and follow the pattern of results
obtained in Table 2. For example, the 25-kilometer estimate of −0.2736, which is statistically
insignificant at conventional levels, implies a price per hectare discount for leases inside zones
of about 24% on average; the price per hectare discount implied by the 25-kilometer estimate
of −0.3766 from the first column – from the specification that does account for anticipation
effects – is more than 7 percentage points greater in magnitude.
Consider now the range coefficient estimates from the baseline specification, in the first
column of Table 3. The estimates are, for every subsample, slightly lower in value numerically
than the main estimate of −0.1721 from Table 2. For example, the 100-kilometer estimate
of −0.2064 implies an average price per hectare discount for range leases of nearly 19%,
while the main estimate implies an average price per hectare discount of about 16%. For the
most part, the estimates also have lower standard errors than the estimate in Table 2, with
p-values at 0.11 for the 100- and 25-kilometer subsamples, while the 75-kilometer subsample
is statistically significant at the 10% level. We take these estimates as evidence that our
main estimate of the effect of a lease being located in a range area is fairly robust.
Finally, consider the range variable estimates in the second column, from the specification
that includes an interaction term with the distance of a range lease to the nearest boundary.
The coefficient estimates of the range variable, in the second row of each panel, are all
greater in magnitude than the estimate of −0.2687 from Table 2 and, like that estimate, are
all statistically significant at conventional levels. The sign of the estimate of the interaction
term, in the third row of each panel, is positive, though statistically insignificant, and fairly
similar to the main estimate of 0.0096 from Table 2. In terms of what these estimates across
all the panels imply, for a range lease that is 5 kilometers from a zone boundary, the price
per hectare is between 20% and 24% lower on average than an unregulated lease and these
differences are all statistically significant at conventional levels. These estimated effects are
similar to the one based on the main estimates in Panel C of Table 2, which imply a 22%
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Table 3: Sensitivity of estimates based on proximity of leases to nearest zone boundary
Baseline Heterogeneous No anticipation
A. Within 100 km of nearest zone boundary (n = 2503)
Zone -0.3817∗∗∗ -0.3914∗∗∗ -0.2989∗∗∗
(0.1245) (0.1249) (0.0997)
Range -0.2064 -0.3446∗∗
(0.1252) (0.1386)
×Distance to zone boundary 0.0135
(0.0082)
B. Within 75 km of nearest zone boundary (n = 2239)
Zone -0.3329∗∗ -0.3416∗∗ -0.2424∗
(0.1549) (0.1543) (0.1259)
Range -0.2197∗ -0.3221∗∗
(0.1170) (0.1326)
×Distance to zone boundary 0.0099
(0.0089)
C. Within 50 km of nearest zone boundary (n = 1902)
Zone -0.2556 -0.2593 -0.1633
(0.2138) (0.2068) (0.1661)
Range -0.2058 -0.2601∗
(0.1448) (0.1281)
×Distance to zone boundary 0.0058
(0.0168)
D. Within 25 km of nearest zone boundary (n = 1576)
Zone -0.3766∗ -0.3790∗ -0.2736
(0.2150) (0.2161) (0.1858)
Range -0.2286 -0.3992∗∗
(0.1364) (0.1485)
×Distance to zone boundary 0.0224
(0.0196)
Notes: The dependant variable is the logarithm of price per hectare at the lease level. All specifications
include the specified latitude-longitude polynomial, zone region fixed effects, firm-year fixed effects,
and lease-specific controls. The number of observations for each subsample is denoted by n. Robust
standard errors, adjusted for clustering by caribou zone, in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote estimates
different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels.
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statistically significant price discount per hectare. Altogether, we take these estimates as
suggestive that our main estimates in Table 2 are stable across smaller subsamples of our
data, based on distance to regulation boundaries.
For the second robustness check, we investigate the role that the quadratic polynomial
in latitude and longitude plays in our estimates in Table 2. As we describe in Section
4, we arbitrarily chose a quadratic polynomial to approximate the unknown function f in
equation (2). To evaluate how sensitive our estimates are to the choice of latitude-longitude
polynomial, we re-estimate the full specifications from Table 2 using polynomials of lower
and higher degree. Panel A reports estimates from a linear polynomial, Panel B reports
estimates from a cubic polynomial, while Panel C omits latitude and longitude.26 The first
column reports estimates from the baseline specification, the second column reports results
from estimating equation (3), while the third reports estimates when misspecifying range
leases as unregulated. Since each specification utilizes all of the controls, the estimates in
each column are directly comparable to the corresponding panel estimate in column (5) of
Table 2.
Consider first the estimates based on the linear polynomial, reported in Panel A. The
first column reports estimates from the baseline specification. The zone coefficient estimate
of −0.2885 implies that the price per hectare for a lease inside a zone is 25% lower than
the price per hectare for an unregulated lease, which is smaller in magnitude than the price
discount of 30% implied by the estimate of −0.3536 in column (5), Panel A, of Table 2. The
range coefficient estimate of −0.1735 is virtually identical to the estimate in Table 2. The
second column reports estimates from the specification that allows anticipation effects to
vary by proximity to zone boundary. The coefficient estimates for the range variables are
similar to the ones in Panel B of Table 2: range leases that are near existing zone boundaries
incur statistically significant price discounts relative to unregulated leases, and the price
discount dissipates the farther is a lease from the boundary. The final column of Panel A
reports the zone coefficient estimate from a specification where range leases are categorized
as unregulated. Like the zone coefficient estimates in the first two columns of this panel, the
estimate is numerically smaller in magnitude than the corresponding estimate of −0.2879 in
Table 2, but – supporting the prediction that misspecifying anticipation as non-existent will
underestimate the effect of existing regulation – the estimate is smaller in magnitude than
the zone coefficient estimates in the first two columns.
26We were unable to use polynomials of degree four or higher because, given the rich set of fixed effects
that we employ and the geographic concentration of leases by firms and over time, using polynomials of such
a high degree causes collinearity problems.
28
Table 4: Sensitivity of estimates using different latitude-longitude polynomials
Baseline Heterogeneous No anticipation
A. Linear polynomial
Zone -0.2885∗∗ -0.2920∗∗∗ -0.2261∗∗
(0.0999) (0.0967) (0.1050)
Range -0.1735 -0.2618∗
(0.1181) (0.1398)
×Distance to zone boundary 0.0089
(0.0088)
B. Cubic polynomial
Zone -0.3563∗∗∗ -0.3606∗∗∗ -0.3014∗∗∗
(0.1046) (0.1015) (0.0899)
Range -0.1444 -0.2055
(0.1381) (0.1278)
×Distance to zone boundary 0.0061
(0.0076)
C. No polynomial
Zone -0.3369∗∗∗ -0.3409∗∗∗ -0.2836∗∗∗
(0.1025) (0.1012) (0.0954)
Range -0.1472 -0.2666∗
(0.1301) (0.1489)
×Distance to zone boundary 0.0117
(0.0079)
Observations 2918 2918 2918
Notes: The dependant variable is the logarithm of price per hectare at the lease level. All specifications
include the specified latitude-longitude polynomial, zone region fixed effects, firm-year fixed effects, and
lease-specific controls. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by caribou zone, in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote estimates different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels.
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Panel B of Table 4 reports estimates from using a cubic polynomial in latitude and
longitude. The zone coefficient estimates across the three columns are similar to the estimates
in column (5) of Table 2. The coefficient estimates for the range variables in the first and
second columns are smaller in magnitude than the corresponding Table 2 estimates (and
estimates using different polynomials in this table), likely due to overfitting by the high-
degree polynomial.
Finally, Panel C reports estimates from specifications that omit latitude and longitude.
The coefficient estimates for the zone indicator variable are all similar to those in Table
2. The range coefficient estimate in the first column, using the baseline specification, is
smaller in magnitude than the Panel A estimate in Table 2 and is more imprecisely esti-
mated. The estimate in the second column, −0.2666, and the interaction term coefficient,
0.0117, are similar numerically and in statistical significance to the ones estimated using
the quadratic polynomial, both of which suggest that firms anticipate that zones will be
gradually expanded, which is consistent with historical practice.
Overall, we take the estimates in Table 4 as evidence that the estimates reported in Table
2 are not driven by our choice of a quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude.
5.2 More on the bias from not accounting for anticipation
We can further explore the size of the bias due to not accounting for anticipated rezoning
by exploiting the fact that for some zones the boundary coincides with or is close to the
associated range boundary, while for other zones the boundaries are distant from one an-
other. While still not accounting for anticipated rezoning by categorizing range leases as
unregulated, we do this by estimating a specification of the following form:
pizjt = ν + δ1 zonei + δ2 zonei × sizez +WiΠ + f(xi, yi) + µz + µjt + izjt, (4)
where sizez is a measure of the size of a range associated with zone z. This estimating
equation is similar to a version of equation (2) that omits rangei, but now the (biased) effect
of lying in a zone is equal to δ1 + δ2sizez. Our expectation is that larger range areas which
may be rezoned in the future (and for which anticipated rezoning is unaccounted for), leads
to greater bias in estimates of the price effect of being located inside a zone. The inclusion
of the interaction term allows us to test this prediction, with the expectation that larger
ranges are associated with greater bias, implying δ2 > 0.
We use two different measures for sizez. The first is the total count of leases sold in a
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range area near a given zone over the course of the entire sample. If there are a greater
number of leases near a zone for which rezoning is anticipated and the expected costs of
rezoning are capitalized into their lease prices, we expect the omission of their anticipated
regulation status to dilute the effect of regulation than if there are no leases near a zone for
which regulation is anticipated. The second measure is the distance of the lease in a range
that is farthest from the given zone. Since there is a greater area for which regulation is
anticipated, larger range areas may generate greater bias when range leases are unaccounted
for in comparison to when there is no range area (i.e., the distance is zero because the zone
and range boundaries coincide). Though these variables are similar, their correlation of
approximately 0.5 implies that they are not perfect substitutes for one another.
Table 5: How the size of the bias from not accounting for anticipated rezoning is affected by
the properties of potentially rezoned area
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Interacting zone with total number of leases in range
Zone -0.2695 -0.6242∗∗ -0.2497 -0.2656∗ -0.3166∗∗
(0.3009) (0.2152) (0.1901) (0.1353) (0.1363)
×Lease count in range 0.0042 0.0077∗∗∗ 0.0017 0.0001 0.0004
(0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0014)
R2 0.0051 0.1091 0.1539 0.5531 0.5539
B. Interaction zone with maximum distance from within range to zone boundary
Zone -0.6707 -0.6198 -0.5550 -0.4574∗ -0.4587∗∗
(0.3968) (0.4917) (0.3224) (0.2180) (0.1971)
×Max. distance in range 0.0228 0.0153 0.0136 0.0066 0.0058
(0.0151) (0.0175) (0.0112) (0.0056) (0.0057)
R2 0.0116 0.0992 0.1554 0.5534 0.5541
Quad. poly. in lat/lon N Y Y Y Y
Zone fixed effects N N Y Y Y
Owner-Year fixed effects N N N Y Y
Lease controls N N N N Y
Observations 2918 2918 2918 2918 2918
Notes: The dependant variable is the logarithm of price per hectare at the lease level. Robust standard
errors, adjusted for clustering by caribou zone region, in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote estimates
different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels.
We report coefficient estimates from estimating equation (4) using the two different mea-
sures of range size in Table 5. Panel A reports estimates from using the count of range leases
as the size of a range, while Panel B reports estimates from using the maximum distance
from a range lease.
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Consider first the estimates in Panel A. The coefficient estimates for the zone variable, in
the first row, are all negative in sign, statistically significant, and larger in magnitude than the
estimates reported in Panel C of Table 2. The coefficient estimates for the interaction term,
in the second row, are all positive. Together, the signs of the two sets of coefficient estimates
indicate that the bias on the price effect for leases located in zones depends positively on
the number of unaccounted for range leases. In particular, if there are no range leases
associated with zones (which is the case for three zones), the coefficient estimate in column
(5) is equal to −0.3166, which is numerically similar to the baseline estimate of −0.3536 in
column (5) and Panel A of Table 2, where we do account for which leases are inside ranges.
If the number of unaccounted for range leases is equal to the sample mean of range leases
associated with a zone, 66, then the coefficient estimate for the effect of being in a zone is
statistically significant at the 1% level and equal to −0.2890, which is virtually identical to
the estimate in column (5) and Panel C of Table 2. If the total number of range leases is
equal to the maximum we observe in our sample, 122, then the coefficient estimate of the
effect of lying inside a zone is equal to −0.2696 and is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Together, these estimates indicate that the greater the number of unaccounted for range
leases, the greater is the bias on the estimated effect on existing regulation on lease prices.
The coefficient estimates using the maximum distance of a range lease to a given zone
boundary, reported in Panel B, exhibit a similar pattern to those in Panel A. The coefficient
estimates for the zone variable, in the first row, are negative, statistically significant, and
larger in magnitude than the same-column estimates in Panel C of Table 2. The coefficient
estimates for the interaction term, in the second row, are all positive, indicating zones with
geographically larger range areas lead to greater bias in the estimated effect of regulation
when not accounting for which leases lie in those range areas. If the maximum distance of
range leases associated with a given zone is equal to the minimum, about 250 meters, then
the coefficient estimate for the effect on the price of a lease inside a zone in column (5) is
equal to −0.4571 and is statistically significant at the 5% level. If the maximum distance is
equal to the sample average, about 31 kilometers, the coefficient estimate is equal to −0.2777,
is statistically significant at the 1% level, and is virtually identical to the coefficient estimate
in column (5) and Panel C of Table 2. If the maximum distance is equal to the maximum
observed in the sample, about 68 kilometers, then the coefficient estimate is equal to −0.0623
with a standard error of 0.2346. Altogether, these estimates imply that the bias from failing
to account for which leases are inside ranges, thus anticipating future rezoning, depends on
the area of the range those leases fall into.
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Overall, we take the results from Table 5 as further evidence supporting the prediction
from the model in Section 2 that not accounting for which leases may be subject to potential
rezoning will lead to underestimates of the effect of existing regulation on land prices.
6 The cost of existing and anticipated regulation
Based on our empirical strategy, we have identified the effect of existing and anticipated land
use regulation on auction prices for oil sands leases. Furthermore, the analysis in Section 2
suggests that we can interpret this effect as the present value (PV) cost of complying with,
depending on a lease’s location, existing or anticipated regulation over the lifetime of the
lease. Given our estimation results indicate that the protection zones and the anticipation
of their potential expansion cause negative effects on oil sands lease prices, this section puts
those estimates into context by calculating the aggregate PV of existing and anticipated
regulation for all leases in our sample.
To quantify the total cost of regulation, we need to compute lease prices under the coun-
terfactual scenario where there is no regulation and then calculate the cost, after accounting
for royalties and taxes, by subtracting observed prices from counterfactual prices. To see
this, suppose the observed price for a lease is p. For a lease inside a zone, the effect of lying
in the zone, based on our baseline estimate from column (5) of Table 2, decreases the price
by 30% on average. The counterfactual price in the absence of regulation, which we denote
by p˜, for a lease lying in a zone is therefore p˜ = p/(1 − 0.30). Similarly for a lease lying
in a range, the baseline estimate from column (5) of Table 2 yields a price discount of 16%
on average, so p˜ = p/(1 − 0.16). For unregulated leases, the absence of regulation has no
effect on their prices, so p˜ = p for any lease located outside of zones and ranges. We perform
this calculation for each lease in our sample, and calculate the price, as opposed to price per
hectare, by accounting for the geographic area of the lease.
The difference between a lease’s observed price and its counterfactual price describes
only the loss of auction revenue from regulation. To calculate the PV cost of regulation,
we need to account for corporate taxes and royalties on profits because in Alberta any
costs associated with complying with environmental regulations are deductible from these
taxes. For example, if the sum of corporate and royalty tax rates is denoted by α, where
0 < α < 1, a lease with lifetime real revenue R that is inside the zone, thereby incurring
a cost of regulation, c, generates PV profits equal to (1 − α)(R − c). The PV profits equal
the value of holding the lease and thus equal the price the lease commands in a competitive,
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first-price, sealed-bid auction. The difference in prices between a regulated and unregulated
but otherwise identical lease is equal to (1−α)c. To calculate c, we then need to account for
the sum of royalty and corporate tax rates, α, applied to oil sands leases. At their lowest,
the provincial and federal tax rates during this time are 10% and 15%, respectively. Royalty
rates in Alberta depend on several different factors, and the minimum royalty rate for oil
sands operations during this period is 25%, while the maximum rate is 40%; we use both
rates to provide a range of cost estimates.
We depict four different categories of aggregate PV cost from the regulation in Figure 5.
The height of the bars indicate total PV cost in millions of 2012 Canadian dollars, for the
specified category, for all leases sold during 2003-2012. For each category, we depict the cost
under the minimum royalty rate in dark grey, while the cost under the maximum rate is the
lighter color.
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Figure 5: Total present value cost of regulation based on minimum and maximum royalty
rates when anticipated rezoning is and is not accounted for in estimation
The first category is the PV cost of the regulation for all leases located in zones. Under
the minimum royalty rate, the estimated total cost incurred for leases in the zones is $1.484
billion. The estimated total cost under the maximum royalty is $2.120 billion.
The second category is the cost imposed on the 320 leases that are outside zones – and
thus are unregulated – but are located in ranges where regulation is not currently applied
but where rezoning in the near future is plausibly anticipated. Based on the estimated price
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per hectare discount of 16%, the minimum PV cost imposed on these leases is $160 million
and the maximum cost estimate is $228 million.
Because the regulation imposes costs on both leases that are regulated and leases that
are unregulated but for which potential regulation in the future is anticipated, we calculate
the total PV cost of the regulation as the sum of the costs to leases in the zones and the
ranges. At a minimum, this cost is equal to $1.645 billion, while at a maximum the total
cost is equal to $2.348 billion.
The cost of anticipated regulation accounts for nearly 10% of the total cost of regulation.
Failing to account for anticipated regulation not only implicitly values those costs as being
equal to $0, but also, as we found in Section 5, leads to underestimates of the effect of
protection zones. Based on the biased estimates in column (5) and Panel C of Table 2, the
price per hectare discount when omitting anticipation about rezoning is about 5 percentage
points smaller than when anticipation is accounted for. The aggregate PV cost based on
these biased estimates, depicted as the fourth category in Figure 5, is $1.170 billion at a
minimum and a maximum of $1.673 billion. In comparison to the PV cost estimate for
existing regulation when anticipated rezoning is accounted for in estimation, represented as
the first category in Figure 5, these cost estimates understate the cost of existing regulation
by about 22%. Relative to the total cost estimates which incorporate the cost of existing
and anticipated regulation, the third category in Figure 5, the total cost estimates calculated
from estimation that fails to account for anticipated regulation underestimates the total cost
of regulation by 29%.
These estimates indicate that the prevailing approach to protecting endangered caribou
in Alberta from the adverse effects of oil sands development is costly. Furthermore, all of
the costs depicted in Figure 5 are borne entirely by the government: the costs from foregone
auction revenues are incurred on the auction date, but the foregone royalty revenues are
incurred during the production phase of each lease. And as Hervieux et al. (2013) find,
caribou populations in Alberta are in continued decline and remain at ever greater risk of
extirpation. Together with our finding that the regulation is costly and is incurred entirely
by the government, this suggests that the regulation is ineffective.
7 Conclusion
This paper examines the effects of existing and anticipated regulation on the value of land.
The conventional approach to identifying the effect of regulation, regression discontinuity
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(RD), compares land values across administrative boundaries. In many settings, however,
regulation boundaries can change over time, leading to potential identification issues. In
a simple model of land use regulation and potentially changing boundaries, we show that
comparing land values around existing regulation boundaries underestimates the effect of
regulation if forward-looking agents anticipate a change in the boundaries. We show that by
accounting for such anticipation, one can identify not only the cost of existing regulation,
but also the cost of anticipated regulation.
We apply this approach to auction prices for oil sands leases and zoning regulations
protecting endangered species that are plausibly anticipated to expand in the Canadian
province of Alberta. We find that the existing regulation causes lease prices to decrease
by 30% per hectare on average, while anticipated rezoning causes the price per hectare
of unregulated leases to decrease by 16% on average. When allowing for heterogeneous
anticipation effects, we find such effects to be most pronounced near existing regulation
boundaries, where based on historical regulatory practice rezoning is perceived as most likely
to occur, and the effect dissipates the farther is a lease from those boundaries.
The results in this paper provide several lessons. First, our model shows that accounting
for anticipation effects caused by potentially changing administrative boundaries is critical
to identifying the effect of regulation on land values. Not accounting for anticipation un-
derestimates the effect of regulation. This phenomenon extends beyond land use regulation
to any context where administrative boundaries defining where policy is applied, providing
useful variation to identify the effect of the policy, can change over time. Second, our empir-
ical results indicate that anticipation effects matter in practice: anticipation about potential
rezoning significantly decreases the price of unregulated oil sands leases, resulting in a loss
of government revenue exceeding $100 million. Furthermore, failing to account for anticipa-
tion effects underestimates the total cost of the regulation by nearly one-third. Given that
we estimate the present value cost of the regulation to be in the billions of dollars, such a
difference in cost estimates underscores the importance of accounting for anticipation when
evaluating policy based on land values.
Our paper has broader lessons for policymakers. While delaying potential future reg-
ulation may have its benefits, the behavior by consumers or, in our case, firms caused by
anticipating future regulation may come with considerable costs. In such a case, it is opti-
mal for policymakers to weigh those costs, in addition to carefully considering how to signal
future policy change, when designing public policy.
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A Appendix
Table A1 reports all coefficient estimates from column (5) for each panel in Table 2. The
results for Panel A of Table 2 are reported in the first column, labelled “Baseline” to indicate
our baseline specification. The results from Panels B and C are reported in the second
and third columns, respectively. We report the coefficient estimates for the zone indicator
variable, the range indicator variable, and the range variable interacted with distance to zone
boundary for convenience.
Table A1: Full set of coefficient estimates from column (5) of Table 2
Baseline Heterogeneous No anticipation
Zone -0.3536∗∗∗ -0.3604∗∗∗ -0.2879∗∗∗
(0.0878) (0.0850) (0.0905)
Range -0.1721 -0.2687∗
(0.1174) (0.1513)
×Distance to zone boundary 0.0096
(0.0092)
Number of joint owners -0.1227 -0.1265 -0.1176
(0.2685) (0.2669) (0.2598)
Key wildlife area -0.1756∗∗∗ -0.1737∗∗∗ -0.1670∗∗∗
(0.0391) (0.0396) (0.0417)
Special access area 0.3183 0.3315 0.2904
(0.4047) (0.4052) (0.4072)
Log(depth) -0.2284 -0.2303 -0.2667
(2.6386) (2.6312) (2.6577)
Notes: The dependant variable is the logarithm of price per hectare at the lease level. Robust standard
errors, adjusted for clustering by caribou zone, in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote estimates different
from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels.
The coefficient estimates across all specifications for the number of joint owners, listed
in the fourth row, are all similar and indicate that the price per hectare for a lease decreases
with the size of group ownership over a lease; this variable likely proxies for risk, as the
practice in this industry is to share risk by entering into joint ownership. The coefficient
estimates for the key wildlife area are negative and statistically significant, indicating that
the price for a lease subject to the key wildlife land use regulations is lower than the price
for a lease that is not in that area. The opposite is true for special access areas, though
these are imprecisely estimated given few leases in our sample lie in these areas and the ones
that do are all unregulated leases. The coefficient estimate for the logarithm of core depth
is statistically insignificant, but being of negative sign is consistent with the notion that
40
deeper deposits are costlier to extract. This variable is likely statistically insignificant for
two reasons. First, oil sands are fairly similar within a given region, so there is likely little
variation in depth. Second, shallower deposits are more lucrative and so leases are likely
purchased in order of depth. As a result, leases purchased in a given year likely do not vary
much in depth.
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